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INTRODUCTION
Devastating violent acts committed by criminals and intrusive surveillance conducted by
government officials have each stirred public outcry and prompted subsequent legal reforms to
surveillance programs. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
represented an incredible compromise to facilitate aggressive law enforcement while protecting
civil liberties. 2 A decade later, Congress carefully tailored the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) to restrict aggressive government surveillance to foreign targets while increasing
protections for Americans potentially impacted by the surveillance. 3 FISA bridges the gap
between classified intelligence operations and transparent criminal and diplomatic remedies.
While all three branches of government have developed an effective tool against foreign
adversaries through amended legislation, enabling executive orders, and interpreting cases, both
the government and defendants ultimately face a lose-lose situation with FISA. For the
government, FISA prosecutions fail to adequately protect sensitive law enforcement techniques.
For defendants, FISA prosecutions fail to provide the typical adversarial protections expected in
a criminal proceeding.
CLEARED PUBLIC DEFENDER RECOMMENDATION
Congress should fund at least one federal public defender who would maintain a security
clearance in order to review classified FISA information used to prosecute defendants. That
cleared public defender would safeguard sensitive information while ensuring that defendants
receive robust legal representation. Justice Stevens warned against assuming that law
enforcement could simultaneously accomplish its primary mission while still advocating for
defendants, cautioning, “I doubt that it is possible for one to wear the hat of an effective adviser
to a criminal defendants while at the same time wearing the hat of a law enforcement authority.” 4
Instead of relying on the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), national security
prosecutors, and federal district court judges to protect a defendant’s rights as a collateral duty, a
dedicated federal public defender would make that protection his or her primary duty. Depending
on the funding appropriated by Congress and a defendant’s preference, a cleared public defender
could represent the defendant through the entire process or only for discovery and pretrial
motions. In a bifurcated process, the cleared public defender would be able to review all
classified information obtained through discovery and filter it into unclassified recommendations
to the defendant’s other attorney.

2

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat.197 (codified as amended in 18
U.S.C. §2510-2522).
3
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §1801 (1978).
4
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 310 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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HISTORIC NEED FOR SURVEILLANCE REGULATION
Before regulating the specifics of modern foreign intelligence surveillance, Congress first
evaluated the Fourth and Fifth Amendment ramifications of emerging, Prohibition-era
surveillance techniques. Following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Olmstead v. US,
277 U.S. 438 (1928) –– which held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because the
telephonic eavesdropping was not a physical seizure; and, thus, no Fifth Amendment selfincrimination resulted from the legal eavesdropping –– Congress enacted the 1934 Federal
Communications Act, 5 creating the Federal Communications Commission and the regulatory
basis for future rules on modern communications. 6 However, these new regulations only applied
to federal surveillance activities, which at the time were far fewer than state surveillance
operations. 7 The Supreme Court had not yet ruled on Mapp v. Ohio, the case that extended
Fourth Amendment protection to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment due process
provisions. 8 Not surprisingly, early surveillance regulations only attempted to create a general
framework, without distinguishing between the parties targeted or the content at issue.
Subsequent legislation, particularly FISA, proved to be more contentious because it
distinguished the parties targeted and the content regulated under the new law. 9
Congress considered the “intimate relation” between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as
illegally obtained evidence could coerce someone into a confession. 10 Many interpreting cases
addressed bootlegging during the Prohibition. 11 Curiously, while the Fourth Amendment still
plays a prominent role in surveillance analysis, courts have not expanded the Fifth Amendment
analysis on the rights of the accused. Perhaps this is because surveillance is a preliminary
investigative activity that may not lead to an ultimate charging and determination of guilt. If a
suspect typically has no representation while police obtain a warrant, then no additional
protection would be created for a suspect in a similar, but secret, surveillance warrant process.
Another distinguishing factor is that the 1920s cases mostly involved alcohol and corrupting
morals. 12 In these cases, a suspect should have been able to challenge that characterization of
immoral behavior early in the proceedings. Subsequent cases involving high-risk national
security matters place a higher priority on first investigating and disrupting the threat before
giving the suspect an opportunity to present a defense. However, once law enforcement has
mitigated the threat, defendants should be able to fully challenge the investigative methods and
evidence gathered for the subsequent prosecution. To be clear, ex parte proceedings to obtain a
warrant should allow law enforcement the desirable upper hand to respond to a threat (real or

5

47 U.S.C §151 (1996).
47 U.S.C. §11 (1988).
7
See generally Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967).
8
Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643 (1961).
9
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §1801 (1978).
10
Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong. (1962),
http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.uwyo.edu/congressional/docview/t21.d22.cmp-1962-sjs-0010.
11
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §1801 (1978).
12
See e.g. Olmstead v. US, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); See Nardine v. US, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
6
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perceived), while criminal trials should fully empower the defendant to rebut those earlier
presumptions and force the government to carry its burden of proof.
FROM TITLE III TO FISA: THE NEED FOR SURVEILLANCE AND OVERSIGHT
Congress drafted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 in
deference to the constitutional standards promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in
deciding Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), which held that a New York state law
permitting sweeping surveillance and allowing new surveillance devices was too broad, and Katz
v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which held that the defendant had an expectation of
privacy in using a telephone booth and that the government’s electronic surveillance violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. 13 The Berger Court distinguished aggressive state use of surveillance
for investigations and prosecutions from the waning federal use of surveillance in prosecutions:
“We are also advised by the Solicitor General of the United States that the Federal Government
has abandoned the use of electronic eavesdropping for ‘prosecutorial purposes.’” 14 The Solicitor
General’s characterization of diminishing use of surveillance in federal prosecutions would be
proven incorrect in the coming decades, especially given the increased number of tools against
foreign adversaries allowed by FISA. The Berger Court, however, correctly predicted the
increased use of surveillance devices and their impact on investigations and individual rights:
Despite these actions of the Federal Government there has been no failure of law
enforcement in that field . . . [T]he fantastic advances in the field of electronic
communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual; . . .
indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional
questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . While the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate
needs of law enforcement . . . it is not asking too much that officers be required to
comply with the basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost
secrets of one's home or office are invaded. Few threats to liberty exist which are
greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices. 15
The majority in Katz held that none of the delineated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment (hot
pursuit, action incident to arrest, consensual act) applied, because the placing of a surveillance
device required some forethought. 16 Justice White disagreed in his concurring opinion, stating
that the Court should recognize a warrant exception for certain national security matters: “We
should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the
United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of
national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.” 17 Justice Douglas
disagreed with allowing the President or Attorney General to make that decision:
13
S.
Rep.
No.
95-604,
pt.1,
at
3914
(1978),
http://www.cnss.org/data/files/Surveillance/FISA/Cmte_Reports_on_Original_ Act/SJC_FISA_Report_95-604.pdf.
14
Berger v. N.Y., 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967).
15
Id. at 62-63.
16
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).
17
Id. at 364.
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The President and Attorney General are properly interested parties, cast in the role
of adversary, in national security cases. They may even be the intended victims of
subversive action. Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot agree that
where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment
rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the
position of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate . . . .
Article III, § 3, gives "treason" a very narrow definition and puts restrictions on
its proof. But the Fourth Amendment draws no lines between various substantive
offenses. 18
Subsequent surveillance laws did not distinguish between the seriousness of offenses as
suggested by Justice Douglas. Instead, FISA, as enacted, simply provided a secure venue to
determine the reasonableness of a warrant and protect sensitive information, without making a
determination of the seriousness of the alleged offense. 19 Justice Douglas correctly predicted
how FISA would blur the line between prosecutors and judges. Creating a designated public
defender to review all classified surveillance on behalf of defendants would restore some balance
between the initial gathering of evidence and a later ruling on its admissibility.
Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 almost five years after
President Kennedy’s assassination, suggesting that the law was more than just an impulsive
reaction to the national tragedy. In 1967, eavesdropping concerns focused on private detectives
and other non-governmental use of emerging wiretapping technologies. The resulting legislation
gave the government an exclusive right to eavesdrop on the public, with a civil penalty available
in lawsuits against private investigators and other potential violators. 20 This raises several
concerns. The government monopoly on surveillance suggests that only private investigators
would violate an individual’s privacy. The legislative history did not consider the potential for
government intrusions on an individual’s privacy. 21 While the civil remedy was intended for use
against individual violators in a private capacity, perhaps an enterprising litigator could
repurpose it for suits against agency officials and even the investigators who personally conduct
questionable surveillance. Having a designated public defender to review all FISA materials used
in prosecutions would provide a more accurate picture of any government overreach. The current
system only reveals this information if the trial court judge rules that a defendant should see that
information. Otherwise, defendants and the public might never realize the overreach of a
particular investigation. Unlike bulk data collection targeting entire segments of the population,
FISA investigations disproportionately impact the particular individual or group prosecuted.

18

Id. at 360.
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978).
20
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat.197 (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C § 3711).
21
Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong. (1962),
http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.uwyo.edu/congressional/docview/t21.d22.cmp-1962-sjs-0010.
19
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NATIONAL SECURITY INTRUSIONS INTO PRIVACY INTERESTS
Congressional consideration of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 dodged
some of the difficult questions emerging in the 1960s, like failing to make a bright-line
distinction between domestic and foreign targets. Ideally, private citizens and groups covered
under the First Amendment would enjoy the full protection of the Constitution and other laws,
but foreign and subversive enemies would be excluded. Deferring to the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Communist Party, U.S.A. v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961), which
held that even domestic communist groups fall under the umbrella of a hostile foreign group,
Congress carefully avoided delineating the line between overlapping domestic and foreign
targets. 22
Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to provide federal
support for state and local law enforcement. Title I of the Act provided for Department of Justice
grants and the funding of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Academy at
Quantico, Virginia for education and training of police chiefs. 23 Title II of the Act attempted to
restrict Miranda rights. 24 At first glance, Title III of the Act seemingly restricted the use of
surveillance techniques. A closer reading reveals that the Act carves out a broad exception to
combat foreign threats:
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation
against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence
activities . . . . The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by
authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received
in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception
was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as necessary
to implement that power. 25
This broad exception –– legislated for executive power –– speaks to the concerns of the time.
Fighting foreign adversaries, especially communists, was a national priority that overshadowed
other civil rights concerns. However, the broad exception still remained deferential to the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. This foreshadowed future FISA legislation and cases
that evaluated government surveillance based upon its reasonableness. This broad executive
authority also illustrates the swinging pendulum of laws in the United States: As one law granted
extensive powers, subsequent abuses of those powers motivated Congress, the judiciary, and
even the president to later reign in those powers under public pressure. Future FISA amendments

22

See id.
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat.197 (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C § 3711).
24
Id. (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C §3501).
25
See id. (codified as amended in 34 U.S.C. §10110).
23
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to create a permanent public defender would satisfy both government and privacy interests by
limiting publicity and providing increased government accountability during prosecutions.
The 1972 Keith court (United States v. United States Dist. Court) further explored Title III
presidential powers within the realm of national security. The Court stated that its holding did
not limit presidential powers to monitor foreign targets but instead focused on limitations against
domestic suspects, especially groups participating in protected First Amendment activities:
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth
Amendment values not present in cases of "ordinary" crime. Though the
investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there
greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech . . . History abundantly
documents the tendency of Government –– however benevolent and benign its
motives –– to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies.
Fourth Amendment protections become [all] the more necessary when the targets
of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political
beliefs. Senator Hart addressed this dilemma in the floor debate on § 2511 (3):
As I read it –– and this is my fear –– we are saying that the President, on his
motion, could declare –– name your favorite poison –– draft dodgers, Black
Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists to be a clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government. 26
The Court’s analysis suggests a “know it when I see it” distinction expected from the President
and law enforcement to respect First Amendment activities while aggressively responding to
foreign threats. The fact that the FBI, under then Director J. Edgar Hoover, responded to
legitimate civil rights activities as a part of the perceived communist threat, 27 indicates that
executives failed to make the correct distinction expected by the court. This extensive history of
abuse calls for increased protections in the form of a dedicated public defender who would weigh
in on First Amendment distinctions without disclosing sensitive techniques to nefarious groups.
Recognizing growing abuses in domestic investigations, Senator Frank Church conducted
extensive hearings to document the scope of intrusions. Senior Justice Department officials,
including the Assistant Attorney General, readily conceded that abuses of power, approved by
the Attorney General, had been committed, including the wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.:
Mr. SCHWARZ: All right. Now turning to the terms under which the taps were
actually put on in October, or authorized in October, would you turn to the
document dated October 10, 1963, and read into the record the first sentence of
the fourth paragraph, please.

26

United States v. United States D., 407 U.S. 297, 313-314 (1972).
Jen Christensen, The FBI’s secret memos show an agency obsessed with “neutraliz(ing)” MLK, CNN (Nov. 14,
2014, 7:20PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/14/us/fbi-and-mlk/.
27
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Mr. EVANS [reading]. "After this discussion, the Attorney General said he
thought we should go ahead with the technical coverage on King on a trial basis,
and to continue it if productive results were forthcoming." 28
The Assistant Attorney General conceded the widespread abuses, but explained that much of the
problem stemmed from a lack of clear rules governing the limits on investigations and called for
Congress and the President to provide robust guidelines and oversight:
The approach I would like to take in testifying is not to contribute to the litany of
condemnation of past abuses by the FBI. I think, given the committee's
investigation to date, we are in a position to stipulate abuse. The question really is
what should be done about the abuse now so as to avoid it in the future.
The nature of the problem facing the committee is, I believe, inherent in any free
society. It is an examination of tension that exists between individual rights and
the common good and it calls for Government to strike a balance between them.
How that balance is struck depends among other things on our Constitution, the
will of Congress, the individual making the decision, and the historical moment in
which the decision is made. These hearings have focused attention on how the
FBI has for decades failed to weigh properly individual rights in seeking to
protect their perception of the common good. To attempt to place all of the blame
for the abuse on the FBI or on J. Edgar Hoover is in my opinion to fail to face the
fact that both the Congress and the executive branch ignored a fundamental
concern of the Founding Fathers of this country and permitted too much
unchecked power to accumulate in one man's hands.
I think the fact that Hoover greatly abused his power is true. But to paraphrase the
old adage, when we consider his opportunities we must marvel at this moderation.
For more than 40 years he reigned supreme, virtually unchecked by either the
executive or legislative branches. 25
This criticism of unchecked power rings as true today as it did in 1975. While convenient to
criticize the agents who carry out surveillance mandates, logically the public should also fault
Congress and the President for allowing such widespread programs to function. These
programmatic decisions require careful judgment calls on how to balance civil rights with robust
security programs. The testimony explained that surveillance overreach was not the product of
nefarious officials but rather of unchecked powers. Creating a dedicated public defender position
would add an additional, adversarial layer of accountability. The Assistant Attorney General’s
call for increased guidelines and governmental accountability in achieving that desired balance
finally came to fruition in 1978. 29

28

Intelligence Activities: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 168 (1976), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94intelli
gence_activities_VI.pdf.
29
Id. at 258.
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THE HISTORIC FISA COMPROMISE
The 1978 FISA Conference Report discussed many of the Church Committee concerns. 30
Members of Congress wanted assurances that the program would only target foreign nationals
and not unpopular domestic political activists. Congress was divided about whether to evaluate
secret warrants throughout the existing federal judiciary or to create one centralized FISA court.
Congress ultimately agreed to create one central court, a “unique historical consensus-supported
by everyone from the FBI and CIA to the ACLU.” 31 Congressional opinion on the proposed
FISA court ranged from celebration over the fact that the bill joined “often disparate thoughts
into one well-crafted piece of legislation supported by practically all of the thinking elements of
our society," to criticism that the court would be an American version of the repressive British
Star Chamber. 32 Wyoming’s last Democrat elected to Congress, Teno Roncalio, voted for the
FISA. 33 Wyoming’s Republican Senators Clifford Hansen and Malcolm Wallop also voted for
the FISA, but Senator Wallop used his time on the Senate floor to express concerns about mixing
criminal justice and foreign affairs functions within one judicial body. 34
The intelligence community wanted to protect sensitive sources while actively investigating
foreign threats; similarly, Congress wanted to facilitate those investigations while creating robust
executive and congressional oversight. 35 Illinois Congressman Robert McClory, recognizing
these delicate balances, proposed compromises that would maintain Fourth Amendment privacy
protections without granting foreign adversaries too much room to operate. 36 McClory emerged
as the hero who resisted many of the proposed overreactions that would have forced the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and FBI to reveal confidential sources and compromise many of their
best tools. Had McClory not fought such an uphill battle to protect the intelligence community,
perhaps he could have added increased protections for both sides, especially in the form of a
dedicated public defender.
The Conference Report discussed the difficulty of monitoring communist groups: Soviets
increasingly recruited agents from international media and other First Amendment protected
events in order to bypass Western monitoring. “This is a ‘Catch 22.’ How can the FBI know if a
crime is being prepared without some surveillance?”37 Hostile adversaries took advantage of free
world protections to shield their operations.
First Amendment protected activities still offer a way to skirt monitoring, although warrants and
executive approval can address instances of misuse of these liberties. This leads to the question
30

See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978),
http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.uwyo.edu/legisinsight?id=PL95-511&type=LEG_HIST.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
124 Cong. Rec. S10,896 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1978) (statement of Sen. Wallop),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1978-pt9/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1978-pt9-1-1.pdf.
35
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978),
http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.uwyo.edu/legisinsight?id=PL95-511&type=LEG_HIST.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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of remedies. Congress never enacted a new remedy to accompany the new FISA procedures,
relying instead on the exclusionary rules under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments for improperly
obtained evidence. 38 These rules function well to protect defendants during criminal proceedings
in which the judge opts to release pertinent information obtained through FISA but are of limited
use to someone not charged with an offense. This leads to the important question of what
remedies, if any, should be available to a person wrongly targeted for surveillance. On the one
hand, ignorance is bliss; if a person does not even know that his or her rights have been violated,
the intrusion likely does not impact his or her daily life. On the other hand, fundamental rights
are sacred, and any violation, even if unknown, still leads to an erosion of civil rights. This
explains the public outcry after the Edward Snowden leaks of information regarding National
Security Agency bulk collection programs. While no one was prosecuted based on the general
(metadata) information gathered, the intrusions still occurred. In contrast to the selective
application of the FISA program, the United States Postal Service mail cover program has
expanded post-9/11 to include most first class mail. 39 While the universal coverage is shocking
at first, citizens might be relieved to know that the program only includes the origin and
destination information, not the internal content of the mail. Additionally, the fact that every first
class envelope is recorded allays concerns about selective targeting. This underscores the need
for a dedicated public defender for those individually impacted. The public at large has many
collective remedies against the bulk collection programs when compared to defendants, who
might be ignorant of the nature of the evidence they alone face.
Executive Order 12333 provided additional guidance for the various agencies tasked with
counterintelligence investigations and responsibilities. The Order restricted CIA searches and
surveillance domestically and, while clarifying similar FBI responsibilities domestically, placed
further Attorney General supervision over those sensitive FBI responsibilities. The Order
commendably reined in human testing and government assassinations. 40 The Order demonstrates
many of the presidential functions to manage the intelligence community. He or she can direct
agency activities, manage budgets, and set goals and restrictions. These broad powers also
suggest the resulting limitations. Successful capacity building in an agency makes it harder to
externally manage its increasingly autonomous activities. Similarly, that successful capacity
building can come at the expense of other important goals, like protecting civil rights. Lastly,
even a well-informed president may struggle to navigate the gray area between aggressive
programs and appropriate restrictions. A dedicated public defender would challenge the
President and Attorney General to competitively balance the interest in promoting aggressive
investigations with the interest in protecting the accused.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF FISA
Even with extensively debated legislation and carefully contemplated executive action,
intelligence programs require judicial interpretation. For FISA and related surveillance programs,
38

See id.
See Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-mail.html (describing the mail cover process of
recording all sender and destination information on the outside of envelopes).
40
Exec. Order No. 12, 333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981).
39

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2018

11

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 7

RERUCHA: LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL SHAPING OF FISA

11

courts have instrumentally provided bright-line rules and clarification for the conduct of those
programs. Ideally, court rulings will promote increased effectiveness of programs while
simultaneously protecting fundamental rights at risk. Historically, federal courts mostly ruled on
cases based upon some geographic connection to the court’s jurisdiction. Congress debated
whether to maintain this geographic distribution or to consolidate foreign surveillance decisions
into one court. Congress ultimately opted for a single, consolidated FISA court, in part to reduce
the dissemination of classified information and increase security for the court. 41 Post 9/11,
Congress doubled down on the centralized court by requiring that at least three judges live within
20 miles of the court. 42 Considering the historical alternative, each federal district court could
have considered foreign surveillance warrants, possibly resulting in different surveillance
standards among the circuit courts. This could have resulted in some absurd results, as, for
instance, if different regions allowed different levels of surveillance for the same foreign
adversary. The consolidated court progressively acknowledged the reality of interstate
communications and the fact that threats do not stop at state lines or national borders. For
subsequent prosecutions based on information obtained under FISA, the federal trial court
exercises its own discretion on what FISA information to allow and what to disclose to
defendants. 43 Rather than limiting these rulings to discussions between the prosecution and the
judge, a dedicated public defender would add a balanced perspective to these evidentiary
motions.
In 1984, members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) operating in the United States challenged
their convictions for firearms and explosives violations, asserting that FISA was
unconstitutionally overbroad and that evidence obtained through FISA failed to meet probable
cause standards. 44 As part of pretrial discovery, the United States provided the defendants with
the fruits of its surveillance, including “copies of all tape recordings, transcripts, surveillance
logs, and pen register tapes of all telephone conversations resulting from the surveillance.” 45
Based upon this information, defendants challenged the evidence:
Defendants moved to suppress the fruits of the FISA surveillance on a variety of
grounds. They contended that FISA surveillance violates a target's First, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendment rights because it is too broad; violates the doctrine of
separation of powers because it requires the courts to decide political questions;
and denies due process and equal protection to aliens. In addition, defendants
contended that the requirements set forth in FISA had not been met because an
insufficient basis had been provided for the issuance of the surveillance order and
because the government had failed to comply with FISA's "minimization"
requirements. They also contended that FISA had been improperly used simply to
obtain evidence of criminal activity rather than to protect the national security. 46
41
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978),
http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.uw yo.edu/legisinsight?id=PL95-511&type=LEG_HIST.
42
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 95 P.L. 511, 92 Stat. 1783, (codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 1803).
43
See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
44
United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
45
Id. at 67.
46
Id.
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This challenge to the FISA actions echoed many of the concerns expressed during the legislative
debates, particularly making the distinction between constitutionally protected and nefarious
activities. At worst, FISA could be a weapon against unpopular political expression. In United
States v. Duggan, the court held that based on an objective (not a subjective, political)
consideration of IRA activities, the group fell squarely within the definition of a foreign terrorist
group. 47 The court explained how FISA complied with the Equal Protection Clause for both U.S.
persons (citizens and certain lawful aliens) and non-U.S. persons:
FISA treats United States persons, who are defined principally to include United
States citizens and resident aliens, differently from non-United States persons. . . .
[I]n determining whether or not a target is an agent of a foreign power, the FISA
Judge may make an affirmative finding based solely on activities protected by the
First Amendment if the target is a non-United States person, but not if he is a
United States person . . . . [The] minimization precautions are required only if the
target is a United States person. 48
The Duggan court cited the legislative history of FISA to explain why such a distinction had
been incorporated into the law:
[L]arge numbers of temporary aliens visit the United States and…many of these
aliens are working for foreign intelligence networks. The Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities similarly identified the problem, pointing out that one
quarter of the Soviet exchange students coming to the United States in a ten-year
period were found to be intelligence officers. This Committee is aware that less
intrusive investigative techniques may not be able to obtain sufficient information
about persons visiting here only for a limited time. 49
The Duggan court would have faced a more difficult call had the IRA members also been U.S.
citizens. The court would have decided what scope of protection to grant controversial First
Amendment activities. This might have been a close call had the IRA members been attending
church services or handing out pamphlets. Instead, the IRA’s attempts to ship firearms and
explosives would still fall more within the criminal realm (illegal regardless of the motivations)
than the free expression realm. In this case, the court erred on the side of releasing sensitive
information to defendants to enable their challenges, even though it ultimately ruled against the
defendants. As an alternative, had a cleared public defender reviewed the information obtained
under FISA, that official could have made the same challenges without revealing sensitive
methods and sources to IRA members.
In 1988, the FBI identified Armenian operatives traveling from Los Angeles to Philadelphia to
attack the Turkish consulate. Unable to discern the names or exact itineraries of the operatives,
the FBI failed to secure a warrant and only located their explosives in checked baggage arriving
47
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Id. at 76.
48
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to Philadelphia using canine and x-ray detection. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that exigent
circumstances applied and that no warrant could have been realistically obtained given the
evolving threat. 50 In the resulting case, United States v. Sarkissian, the court declined to
determine whether the primary purpose of the investigation was a foreign intelligence matter
governed by FISA or if it had evolved into a criminal matter governed by Title III. The court
held instead that a foreign intelligence investigation could lead into related criminal matters,
ruling, “FISA is meant to take into account ‘the differences between ordinary criminal
investigations to gather evidence of specific crimes and foreign counterintelligence
investigations to uncover and monitor clandestine activities.’” 51 The court wisely avoided
making such a distinction, as broad foreign intelligence investigations of hostile groups generally
lead to criminal prosecutions as a remedy to imprison or deport foreign agents.
The Sarkissian court also addressed the issue of “graymail”––where defendants force the
government to drop a charge in order protect classified information or to pursue the charge and
expose that underlying sensitive information––holding that the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA) allows a judge to make initial determinations through ex parte and in
camera proceedings. 52 This procedure gave great weight to the government’s initial certifications
that the matter concerned foreign intelligence activities. However, that certification was still
confirmed by the trial judge without releasing the information to the defendants. 53 A dedicated
public defender would better achieve the aims of the CIPA, allowing the defender to make
vigorous motions on behalf of the defendants without revealing classified information to the
defendants themselves and their hostile groups. The public defender would also decrease the
burden on intelligence agencies to disclose information, offer plea deals, or sacrifice more
challenging prosecutions based on concerns about disclosing sensitive investigative techniques. 54
In United States v. Bin Laden, the court considered whether Fourth Amendment protections
applied to a US citizen likely involved with Al Qaeda and living in Kenya, holding that, while
the Fourth Amendment still applied, it would not have been realistic to obtain a warrant to search
the Kenyan safe house. 55 Even though the Attorney General approved of the overall operation
targeting Al-Qaeda, the court ruled that the telephonic surveillance was illegal because a warrant
should have specified the likely U.S. citizen targeted in Kenya. Despite the technical violation,
the court still allowed the evidence because excluding it was unlikely to deter similar future
conduct and the surveillance had been conducted in good faith. 56 This was a high stakes
decision. Had the court applied the exclusionary rule, it would have deterred future surveillance
of Al Qaeda and similar terrorist groups. That outcome––limiting surveillance––would be
contrary to aggressively responding to such growing threats. Rather than risking this all or
nothing remedy of excluding evidence, a cleared public defender would provide another view on
the fruits of the surveillance short of excluding it entirely. Bin Laden was also the first FISA case
50
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to consider whether a physical search of an overseas residence also fell within the scope of the
national security exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the residential search
was permissible based on the government’s showing of special need and reasonable scope. 57
In United States v. Abu-Jihaad, Abu-Jihaad (formerly Paul Raphael Hall who ominously
changed his legal name to “father of the Jihad” before enlisting in the United States Navy) was
convicted of providing material support to terrorist groups and unauthorized disclosure of
national defense information. Abu-Jihaad challenged the conviction, claiming that the FISA
information obtained was primarily for the criminal investigation and not primarily for foreign
intelligence purposes. Discussing PATRIOT Act updates to the FISA, the court ruled against
Abu-Jihaad, holding that FISA only requires “a significant [foreign intelligence] purpose”:
Among other things, Congress indicated that it did not, in fact, require foreign
intelligence gathering to be the primary purpose of the requested surveillance to
obtain a FISA warrant. Rather, upon satisfaction of all other FISA requirements,
Congress authorized FISA Court judges to issue warrants upon executive
certification that acquisition of foreign intelligence information is "a significant
purpose" of the requested surveillance. 58
The court also denied Abu-Jihaad’s request to review the evidence against him obtained under
FISA, claiming that existing FISA and CIPA procedures adequately protected the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment Rights:
FISA warrant applications are subject to "minimal scrutiny by the courts," both
upon initial presentation and subsequent challenge . . . . [I}n reviewing those
submissions ex parte and in camera . . . the orders did not deny Abu-Jihaad any
information helpful or material to his defense. 59
Rather than relying on the judge’s word that the surveillance information did not contain
anything helpful to the case, a cleared public defender could have reviewed all of the materials
on behalf of the defendant and argued to exclude any questionable evidence. Even if the public
defender’s review and subsequent motions fail to persuade the judge to exclude the evidence, the
adversarial approach would ensure a more balanced proceeding, instead of deferring to the
prosecution and judge entirely.
In 2010, the FBI arrested ten suspected, undeclared Russian agents operating in the United
States. 60 In the published criminal complaints against the suspects, the affiant agent detailed
some of the investigative methods used against the Russians, including intercepting Wi-Fi

57

See id. at 285.
United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).
59
Id. at 130; Id. at 143.
60
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ten Alleged Secret Agents Arrested in the United States: Multi-year FBI
Investigation Uncovers Network in the United States Tasked with Recruiting Sources and Collecting Information for
Russia (June 28, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ten-alleged-secret-agents-arrested-united-states.
58

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2018

15

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 7

RERUCHA: LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL SHAPING OF FISA

15

transmissions and conducting physical surveillance; and while not mentioning the nature of the
previous search warrants obtained, revealed the ultimate fruits of the surveillance:
The SVR [Russian external intelligence agency] has spelled out the purpose of the
Illegals' presence in America in a 2009 message to DEFENDANT#2, a/k/a
"Richard Murphy" and DEFENDANT #3, a/k/a "Cynthia Murphy," the
defendants. That message, which was sent by Moscow Center, has been decrypted
by the FBI and reads, in part, as follows:
You were sent to USA for long-term service trip. Your education, bank accounts,
car, house etc.—all these serve one goal: fulfill your main mission, i.e. to search
and develop ties in policymaking circles in US and send intels [intelligence
reports] to C[enter].61
The information revealed from the criminal complaint demonstrated that the current FISA
warrant system worked as intended by Congress and subsequent interpreting cases. Agents can
either obtain a criminal warrant through a federal magistrate or through a judge assigned to the
FISC. The affiant did not note which process she elected; however, the fact that a federal
magistrate ultimately reviewed the information obtained from the surveillance demonstrated the
additional safeguards triggered following a magistrate’s or a FISC ruling.
While it is troubling that the criminal complaint revealed so much about sensitive
counterintelligence methods (surveillance locations, times, targets, agents, techniques), those
revelations answered the concern about the ex parte nature of FISC proceedings. Publicized
criminal complaints put future suspects on notice of potential surveillance. Finally, even the
published criminal complaint stopped short of the publicity that a trial would have brought to this
investigation. A trial would have allowed the defendants to cross-examine their accusers and
devote more attention to the sensitive techniques deployed. Ultimately, the defendants pleaded
guilty to failing to register as foreign agents, which spared further exposure for both the United
States and Russia. 62 Even with this favorable outcome, a public defender could have facilitated
the process of obtaining guilty pleas from the Russian agents and expedited the deportation
process. Allowing a public defender to represent America’s enemies would increase the
credibility of court proceedings as truly impartial regardless of the parties involved.
This favorable plea bargain and deportation outcome raises an important brinksmanship
hypothetical question: To what extent would the Justice Department reveal sensitive FISA
procedures and investigative techniques if a foreign entity challenged an arrest at trial? In
Sarkissian, the court allowed a “graymail” exception for the government to keep sensitive
materials separate from the rest of information provided to defendants. In an analogous situation
outside of the FISA context, the Justice Department recently advised state and local governments
61
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using the Stingray device (a cellular tower replicator that precisely locates suspects) to either
obtain a plea deal or drop the charges rather than revealing further information about the device
in court. 63 The Justice Department has likely been hesitant to reveal details of the new
technology to unscrupulous defense attorneys and criminal enterprises. In the realm of FISA,
channeling information to a designated public defender would remove the risks associated with
releasing pertinent but classified information to private attorneys and hostile foreign groups.
FISA REFORMS HAVE FALLEN SHORT
Unusually bipartisan-acting Congresses have been responsive to public concerns about FISA.
The PATRIOT Act updated FISA for a post-9/11 world, including provisions for lone wolf
suspects operating outside of foreign hostile groups. 64 Congress has even considered the role of a
public advocate to represent the public interest in bulk collection programs. 65 This public
advocate remedy falls short in two distinct ways. First, the three branches of government should
reform FISA though amendments, executive orders, and court decisions. The government should
act through Constitutional means, not by relegating these larger policy questions to a public czar.
Secondly, instead of a public advocate in a general sense, justice through individual FISA
prosecutions would be better served by a designated public defender acting in a specific capacity
on behalf on defendants. Rather than arguing for changes to the law, that public defender would
make sure that defendants are best represented under the law as it currently stands. Not only
would that enable defendants to make the best arguments against controversial evidence, but it
would limit the government’s disclosure of sensitive law enforcement operations in open court
proceedings.
Federal district courts have recently allowed private defense attorneys to obtain an interim
security clearance in order to review classified materials on behalf of their clients. In at least one
case, this has led to disastrous results where the Government released boxes of classified
information without proper review and the receiving attorney (despite having an interim security
clearance) refused to return the extraneous materials. 66 In this case, a regularly cleared public
defender could have located the relevant documents for the defendant’s case while promptly
returning the extraneous classified materials to the originating agency. Similarly, some scholars
have suggested that the solution lies in the Government declassifying documents for use in open
court. 67 This knee-jerk reaction to rapidly declassify court materials would unnecessarily delay
criminal proceedings and surrender the core FISA compromise of safeguarding sensitive
63

See Ellen Nakashima, Secrecy Around Police Surveillance Equipment Proves a Case’s Undoing, WASH POST.,
Feb. 22, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secrecy-around-police- surveillanceequipment-proves-a-cases-undoing/2015/02/22/ce72308a-b7ac-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html.
64
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of2001, 107 P.L. 56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
65
Andrew Nolan, et. al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts:
Introducing a Public Advocate, Congressional Research Service (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43260.pdf.
66
See Greg Krikorian, Secret Data Exposed in Terrorism Case: Federal officials erred in releasing intelligence
documents
to
an
Islamic
charity's
defense
team,
L.A.
TIMES,
Feb.
16,
2006,
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/16/natio n/na-error16.
67
See Serrin Turner & Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Secrecy Problem in Terrorism Trials (June 7, 2005),
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/secrecy-problem-terrorism-trials.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2018

17

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 7

RERUCHA: LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL SHAPING OF FISA

17

investigative information while protecting personal liberties. A dedicated public defender would
better reconcile the competing goals of parties under FISA.
All three branches of government have been responsive to public concerns and possible areas of
reform for FISA. In stark contrast internationally, the consolidated French surveillance
establishment routinely ignores requests from Parliament for programmatic information. 68
Similarly, Sweden’s consolidated surveillance establishment has been doubly weak in both
conducting investigations and protecting public privacy interests. 69 Thanks to carefully crafted
FISA legislation, enabling executive orders, and evolving judicial interpretations, the United
States has increasingly achieved two opposing (but not mutually exclusive) goals: aggressive
surveillance of foreign targets and robust public protections. Adding a dedicated federal public
defender for FISA prosecutions would further strengthen both original goals of the program:
protecting constitutional rights and enabling a proactive law enforcement response to foreign
threats.
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